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PROMISE AND REALITY IN LEGAL SERVICES*
Roger C. Cramtont
Ten years ago a creative and energetic new federal initiativethe Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity-began to give life to the legal profession's ancient commitment to the principle that each citizen, without regard to
means, should have access to the institutions of justice. The enthusiasm and accomplishment of this creative period led to reaction,
controversy, and challenge. Faced with threats to its continued existence, the Legal Services Program lost some of its innovative zeal and
concentrated on the delivery of legal services to the poor in an
economical and highly professional manner.
Today, much of the controversy over the Legal Services Program
has abated; the gains of the past have been consolidated; the program has matured; and there is general acceptance of the principle
that poor people are entitled to legal representation at public expense. With the establishment of the new national Legal Services
Corporation, an historic opportunity exists for further evolution
and development of the legal services idea.
The creation of an independent corporation was not repudiation of the past, but an extension based on the firm foundation
already laid down. It constituted a shift of emphasis, a codification of
developing restrictions designed to prevent abuses of the program,
and a new beginning in which fresh approaches and energies could
be applied to the further development of the Legal Services Program.
The evolution of the Legal Services Corporation Act' is ably
2
sketched by Warren George in this issue of the CornellLaw Review.
The history is an exciting one of political compromise, and it leaves
him with "cautious optimism" for the future. The constitutional
problems posed by the Act's exclusion from legal services of abortion and desegregation cases, and by its restrictions on political
activity of staff attorneys, are illuminated in a comprehensive Note
* Portions of this article are adopted from a talk to the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association annual meeting in Seattle on November 14, 1975.
t Dean and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Chairman of the Board Qf Directors,
Legal Services Corporation. A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D. 1955, University of Chicago.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Legal
Services Corporation.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-961 (Supp. IV, 1974).
2, George, Development of the Legal Services Corporation, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 681 (1976).

PROMISE AND REALITY IN LEGAL SERVICES

which also appears in this issue.3 Although I disagree with some of
the conclusions of these authors, their work will contribute to the
understanding and solution of current problems.
Before turning to the development of the Act and the specific
problems facing its implementation, it is well to consider the Act's
overall role in providing effective legal services to all Americans.
The Act is predicated on the great principle that the poor are
entitled to a competent lawyer in civil cases. This principle-a congressional policy-also is based on firm constitutional roots.

I
The statutory responsibility of the Legal Services Corporation is to
irovide "high quality legal assistance to those who would be otherwish unable to afford adequate legal counsel."'4 That mandate was
established on the basis of a considered congressional judgment that
"equal access to the system of justice in our Nation" must be provided to all individuals. 5 The task 6f the Corpoi-ation and the legal
profession is to make this lofty goal a i-eality ih the lives of poor
Americans.
The poor in this country are entitieS[ ]o publicly supported legal
assistance because access to the legai system is an inherent right of
citizenship. If political liberty meaiis anything, it must mean the
opportunity to utilize the legal systi6i. One of the responsibilities of
citizenship is living within th l'egal system; one of the rights of
citizenship is to utilize the system. The inherent dignity of each
citizen requires access to justice.
When Congress adopted the Legal Services Corporation Act, it
recognized the vital role of legal services in establishing and maintaining respect for the law. The Act declares that "for many of our
citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our
government of laws. .... -6 Citizens can be expected to obey the law
only if they feel themselves as under, not outside, the law, with full
access to legal rules and legal institutions.
Congress also decided that legal assistance for the poor should
be more than a component of government programs aimed at reducing poverty. It determined that legal assistance for the poor is
3 Note, Depoliticizing Legal Aid: A Constitutional Analysis of the Legal Senpices Corporation Act,
61 CORNELL L. REv. 734 (1976).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2996(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
5 Id. § 2996(1).
6 Id. § 2996(4).
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unlike the social programs of the Community Services Administration and other agencies. Congress found that a separate, private
corporation was essential to ensure that the Legal Services Program
would be "free from the influence of or use by it of political pressures ...-. 7
It is easy to lose sight of the poor themselves and their legal
problems in the welter of statistics about the poor and their need for
legal services. While the statistics are compelling, behind the numbers are real people: a self-reliant ninety-one year old Iowa woman
whose landlord has tired of her and seeks her eviction; a California
wife who is old enough to qualify for Medicare, and whose husband
is qualified, but whose Medicare claim has been disallowed; a World
War I veteran in the Midwest who has lived, gardened, kept bees,
and accumulated junk at the same address since long before the city
grew up around him and wrote zoning laws that said his junkyard is
illegal; a workman who has suffered a nervous breakdown on the
job, but whose state workmen's compensation board rules that mental illness caused by the work situation is not compensable. These are
some of the clients the Congress had in mind when it established the
Legal Services Corporation. They are clients who might never
dream of entering the office of a private attorney since they have no
money to do so.
These clients are among the million poor people served each
year by 258 field programs of the Legal Services Corporation. They
are the fortunate ones: they live in areas where legal services programs exist; they were not turned away because their legal aid office
had been closed down for lack of funds, nor were they denied
assistance because their cases were not of the emergency nature to
which many underfinanced, understaffed legal services programs
must limit themselves.
According to 1970 census data, there are approximately
twenty-nine million poor persons in the United States and its territories. 8 These people are "poor" as defined by the government.
The figure does not include the millions more whose economic
power has been eroded by inflation or who have been caught up in
the rising tide ofjoblessness. Of this total, nearly twelve million poor
people have no access to legal services attorneys.
About seventeen million of the poor live in areas that theoreti8

Id. § 2996(5).
The data in this and the following paragraphs is from L. GOODMAN & M.
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cally offer services, but nearly six million of those have only token
access: less than one lawyer for every 10,000 poor persons. By
contrast, in the general population there is one lawyer for every 893
persons. The state of Georgia, for example, is "covered" by legal
services-yet there is but one legal services lawyer for every 22,700
poor. For another ten million poor, the outlook is only slightly less
bleak: for them, present legal services programs provide only one to
two attorneys for every 10,000 poor. By any criteria, that is wholly
inadequate. Only among the remaining 1.2 million poor persons is
there access to legal services that approaches a significant figure,
varying between two and five attorneys for every 10,000 eligible
persons. Even that figure does not approach the proportion of
attorneys available to those who can pay.
Similar results are reached by extrapolating from the American
Bar Foundation's recent survey of legal needs. 9 This study indicates
that, on the average, twenty-three percent of the indigents in the
United States are faced with a legal problem each year. The range of
problems is staggering: Social Security, housing, consumer matters,
insurance, welfare, family crises, grinding financial problems and
bankruptcies, repossessions, unemployment compensation, and
many more. Since twenty-nine million Americans live in poverty,
their total legal needs may be seen as 6,670,000 legal problems each
year-a figure that increases to 7,870,000 when the effect of unemployment is added.
Since about one million cases are actually handled by legal
services attorneys each year, less than fifteen percent of the potential
need is being met. The others are left to face their private crises
alone. Many of them-and their number is increasing as legal services resources remain virtually static-may have nothing but a brief
letter to show for their attempts to gain access to America's system of
justice: "We regret that there is not now a legal services program
serving your community ....
Only increased funding will enable the Legal Services Corporation to hang out a "walk-in" sign in areas where that sign has been
effectively taken down and in areas where it has never hung at all.
Increased funding is necessary to provide the manpower and resources so that an elderly woman in Texas can reach out for the
same kind of help that saved the Iowa woman from eviction.
But the current funding shortage has reached crisis propor9
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tions. Existing legal services programs are crippled by a budget that
until this year-and in the face of high unemployment and record
inflation-had not been increased since the 1971 fiscal year. These
programs are providing high-quality legal services under the most
discouraging conditions, but their quantitative coverage of the eligible poor in their areas is minimal at best. Following careful evaluation and modification of these existing programs, their capabilities
must be strengthened.
Furthermore, an estimated twelve million (40.5%) of the nation's twenty-nine million poor live in areas where there are no legal
services programs at all. Inflation and unemployment increase that
number even more. Like those in the nominally "covered" areas,
these men and women are "otherwise unable to afford adequate
legal counsel . . . ,"10 in the terms of the Act. Yet they too face
eviction, welfare and Social Security problems, landlord-tenant
disputes-the whole gamut of private legal quandaries that confront
poor Americans everywhere. Unless service is expanded to these
areas, the Legal Services Corporation Act will be, for these people, a
nullity-further evidence that government does not help them.
Congress clearly intended precisely the opposite result.
The Corporation is requesting appropriations that will begin
meeting these needs for legal assistance. The responsibility, however, does not rest solely on the federal government. The private
bar, local communities, and state and local governments also have a
responsibility to see that this aspect of the American dream is
fulfilled. Financial and moral support will be needed from all
sources to accomplish this fundamental objective.
II
The Supreme Court has also emphasized the importance of the
right to counsel. Over ten years ago, the Court declared that the
right to counsel in felony cases is "fundamental."'" Clarence Earl
Gideon had "conducted his defense about as well as could be expected from a layman[,]' 1 2 but the Court recognized that a poor
man whose liberty was threatened by a felony charge could not have
a fair trial without the assistance of a lawyer. The Court reached
back to its language in Powell v. Alabama to illustrate a criminal
defendant's need for counsel:
10 42 U.S.C. § 2996(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
" Gideon v. wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12

Id. at 337.

1976]

PROMISE AND REALITY IN LEGAL SERVICES

The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. . . . He is unfamiliar with the rules of

evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the

guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against
him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction
because he does not know how to establish his inno3
cence.'
These reasons apply with equal force to many civil cases. An
indigent civil defendant may be unable to present his defense because of lack of counsel. Civil litigation encompasses the same range
of complexity found in criminal proceedings. The application of
novel legal theory to uncertain facts can provide the same degree of
challenge. There are technical pleading and pretrial motion procedures that can tax the skills of even the best trained lawyers. The use
of sophisticated discovery devices is often essential to adequate trial
preparation. Competent handling of a trial is a difficult art-so
difficult that Chief Justice Burger and other federal judges have
argued that even many lawyers lack the competence to do an
adequate job. 1 4 If indigent civil litigants are to enforce their rights,
or to defend them against diminution, they often need the assistance
of qualified counsel.
Once the right to counsel in criminal proceedings was established, the logic of extending a similar right to at least some indigent
civil litigants seemed compelling and inevitable. As yet, this development has not occurred. Although the right to counsel has since
been extended to misdemeanor defendants who face the prospect of
time injail,is there has been only limited acceptance of the principle
that indigents have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
in noncriminal proceedings.
There are several reasons for this judicial reluctance. First, the
courts have failed to acknowledge just how far the legal needs of the
poor are from being adequately met. If the courts are aware of this
13Id. at 344-45, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
"4 Burger, The Slpecial Skills ofAdvocacy: Are Specialized Trainingand Certfication ofAdvocates
Essential to Our System ofJustice, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227 (1973); Kaufman, Advocacy as CraftThere is More to Law School Titan a Paper Chase, 28 Sw. L.J. 495 (1974).
15 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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problem, they tend to dismiss the need of poor civil litigants for
counsel by characterizing their legal problems as "simple." Second,
the courts have taken unrealistic and shortsighted views of the due
process and equal protection rights of indigents in civil proceedings.
Third, and perhaps most fundamental, the courts are troubled by
the spectre of limitless public expense if indigent civil litigants are
afforded a right to counsel. This fear suggests that the courts may
not "find" a right to counsel in civil cases until legislatures, state and
federal, make a greater commitment to legal services for the poor
than they have in the past.
The needs of the poor for legal assistance, however, do not
correspond to the judicial distinction drawn between civil and criminal actions. Civil litigation can result in far graver deprivations of
liberty or prosperity than confinement in jail for a short period of
time after conviction on a misdemeanor charge. Imposition of unrealistic alimony or child support requirements, loss of custody of
children, civil commitment as an incompetent, and eviction involve
consequences of major importance. Post-judgment wage garnishment, or loss of a required license, may make it impossible to find
employment. Inability to challenge housing code violations, fraudulent credit transactions, or welfare terminations may result in great
economic harm.
That a lawyer's assistance may make the difference between
success or failure in a civil case is not simply a theoretical possibility.
A study of mental commitment proceedings in Ohio demonstrated
an almost perfect correlation between the assistance of counsel and
the decision not to commit. 16 Another study found that civil plaintiffs representing themselves had little chance of surviving a motion
to dismiss on the pleadings or of settling a case, and virtually no
chance to obtain discovery or a trial on the merits.' 7 Yet another
study found that civil defendants represented by counsel in debt
cases were almost six times as successful in obtaining a release from
their debt as those unable to obtain a lawyer. 8
A commitment from our courts to the proposition that civil
litigants have a broad right of access to the justice system requiring
the assistance of counsel would further efforts to meet the true legal
needs of the poor. It is no answer to say that the judge in a civil case
16 Wenger & Fletcher, The Effect of Legal Counsel on Admissions to a State Mental Hospital:A
Confrontation of Professions, 10 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAVIOR 66, 69 (1969).
17 Schmertz, The Indigent Civil Plaintiff in the District of Columbia: Facts and Commentary, 27

FED. B.J. 235, 243 (1967).
18B. RUBIN, CONSUMERS AND COURTS 109 (1971).
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can inject himself into the proceedings so as to counteract the absence of counsel. Judicial ethics and the adversarial system require
impartiality of judges. Moreover, the fate of the unrepresented
indigent defendant should not be made to depend on the courts'
ability to take the place of counsel. In many civil cases, if poor
litigants do not have the assistance of counsel while their adversaries
do, then their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection are subverted.
III
In a free society, the system of justice rests on a fundamental
notion of social contract: we give up our right to resolve disputes by
force because a substitute arena-the courts-exists to decide such
disputes. But if this arena is to be a meaningful substitute, all must
have an equal opportunity to enter and to prevail there. Equal
opportunity in the courts often requires the assistance of counsel,
appointed if necessary.
The right to a "fair hearing" is a fundamental tenet of constitutional due process. The courts have recognized that as the gravity of
the consequence increases, the scope of due process protection expands. But the courts have not fully recognized that the gravity of
the consequences flowing from success or failure in civil cases is
often equivalent to that involved in criminal cases. An unskilled civil
litigant is no better equipped to present his case than is his counterpart in the criminal courts. Thus, where the consequences of failure
in civil litigation are sufficiently grave, an indigent is denied due
process if he does not have the guiding hand of counsel at every step
of the proceedings. Without such assistance he simply has no meaningful "access" to the justice system.
The kinds of civil matters in which the potential consequences
are sufficiently grave to require the assistance of counsel have already been mentioned. Obviously, civil commitment is one. Loss of
custody of children is another. Contested divorces, or divorces in
which child custody or support are at issue, would also seem to
require a lawyer's participation. Loss or impairment of housing,
furnishings, public assistance, or employment are also consequences
that have a profound influence on the ability of our poor citizens to
lead decent lives. Where these consequences are threatened, the
assistance of a lawyer ought to be mandatory.
If the poor cannot hire a lawyer and without a lawyer their
chances of enforcing claims or vindicating rights are impaired, then
the justice system is in effect closed to people because of their
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poverty. When "the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has[,]' 9 the poor are denied equal protection as well as
due process.
As in the due process context, an equal protection argument
can be constructed by focusing on the gravity of consequences or the
importance of the interests involved. When the consequences
threatened are sufficiently grave, and a due process right to counsel
attaches, a failure to appoint counsel for the poor amounts to a
denial of equal protection. Desires to protect the public purse or
discourage frivolous litigation are insufficient justification for ignoring the needs of poor civil litigants.
The utility of such an approach is apparent. No rule directing
the appointment of counsel in every case would be necessary. The
court would simply be required to determine whether the interests
threatened are sufficiently important and the issues sufficiently
complex to require the appointment of counsel. A flexible case-bycase approach could be relied upon to develop the parameters of a
right to counsel in civil litigation. Most important, a clear signal for
improvement of civil legal assistance would be given to legislative
bodies. The legislatures could respond by appropriating the funds
necessary to ensure implementation of a basic constitutional right or
by developing creative alternatives to appointment of counsel in
certain kinds of cases. For example, the aid of well-trained paralegal
assistants in some matrimonial and welfare disputes might assure
that an indigent gets a fair hearing.
Although there has been some movement towards recognizing
a constitutional right to counsel in certain special situations-usually
where the state is involved as one party, as in civil commitment and
child neglect proceedings 2 0 -early hopes that a comprehensive
theory would be forthcoming have been disappointed.
In Boddie v. Connecticut2 ' the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the application to indigents of a statute requiring the filing
of court fees as a condition precedent to bringing a divorce action.
The Court held that the statute's application violated the due process requirement of a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but
carefully limited the scope of its decision. The Court stressed the
important position of the marriage relationship in this society's
19 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
20

See, e.g., it re Ella B., 30 N.Y.2d 352, 285 N.E.2d 687, 334 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1972) (child

neglect proceedings); In re Fisher, 39 Ohio St. 2d 71, 313 N.E.2d 851 (1974) (civil commitment
proceedings).
21 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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hierarchy of values and the states' "monopoly of the means" of
formally dissolving a marriage. It concluded that the state interests
involved-preventing frivolous litigation and preserving the public
treasury-were outweighed by the denial of due process. Although
Justice Black later argued that Boddie necessitates the appointment
of counsel for indigents in divorce and other civil cases, 22 the Supreme Court has not even been willing to strike down filing fee
23
requirements for other civil proceedings.
The Court's unwillingness to extend Boddie beyond its factual
setting has resulted in unrealistic distinctions. Other civil cases are of
far greater importance to the poor and to society than divorce
proceedings. As a practical matter the courts are often the only
forum with power to settle disputes or vindicate rights, and resort to
judicial process by an indigent litigant is usually no more voluntary
than that of a criminal defendant haled into court to defend himself.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's focus since the Boddie case on
filing fees as the touchstone of access to justice is short-sighted. It
allows courts to declare that so long as such fees are waived the
indigent litigant has an opportunity to be heard, even though he has
no attorney to present his case. For example, in Matter of Smiley 1 4 the
New York Court of Appeals recently held that indigent parties to
divorce actions have no right to appointed counsel. In ruling that
representation by counsel is not a legal necessity for meaningful
access to the courts, the court characterized most divorce litigation
between indigents as "simple" because there are no complicating
money issues to be resolved. The court also implied that existing
legal aid and legal services programs are sufficient to meet the
needs of the poor for legal assistance in divorce cases; if not, the
court suggested that any request for assistance should be addressed
to the legislature.
Obviously, the legal needs of the poor are not being met, and all
divorce litigation is not simple. Where complex defenses are involved, or where such fundamental interests as support or child
custody are disputed, an indigent may not have his position fairly
presented and heard without the assistance of counsel. Something
more basic was troubling the New York court:
22 Meltzer v. C. Buck Le Craw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959-60 (1971) (opinion dissenting
from denial of certiorari, Black, J.).
23 Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (upheld imposition of courtfee to appeal agency

reduction of welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (upheld imposition of
bankruptcy filing fee).
24 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1975).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW
[A]mong the many kinds of private litigation which may affect
indigent litigants, matrimonial litigation is but one. Eviction from
homes, revocation of licenses affecting one's livelihood, mortgage
foreclosures, repossession of important assets purchased on credit, and any litigation which may result in the garnishment of
income may be significant and ruinous for an otherwise indigent
litigant. In short, the problem is not peculiar to matrimonial
litigation. The horizon does not stop at matrimonial or any other
25
species of litigation.
This statement, of course, is correct. It shows that the courts
basically are fearful of taking a step that would require appointment
of counsel in many equally important classes of civil litigation. The
costs of providing counsel in all such cases would be large and the
courts would be uncomfortably dependent upon the legislatures to
pay for this right to counsel.
IV
If a right to counsel in civil cases is to be provided, then the case
must be argued in the legislative halls as well as in the courts. Civil
legal assistance is a responsibility shared by the bar and by each level
of government. On the national level the Legal Services Corporation
must seek appropriations that will allow the Corporation, with the
assistance of private, state, and local funds, to approach the mandated goals of providing equal access to the system of justice and
providing high quality legal assistance to all who cannot otherwise
26
afford it.
We now have a national commitment to the provision of legal
aid to the poor and a new instrumentality-the Legal Services
Corporation-to give life to this commitment. At present, however,
the gap between promise and performance is wide. The statutory
principle of "equal access to the system of justice" is all-inclusive; it
does not apply only to some of the poor, or to those in Vermont but
not those in Alabama, or to those in San Francisco but not those in
Baton Rouge. The ancient commitment of the legal profession, and
the guiding premise of the Legal Services Corporation Act, is that all
who are poor are entitled to adequate representation. The great
challenge of the years ahead is to provide the machinery and resources so that this principle will be observed in practice as well as
honored in theory.
251d. at 440-41, 330 N.E.2d at 57, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 93. See also Brown v. Lavine, 37
N.Y.2d 317, 333 N.E.2d 374, 372 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1975) (denied right to counsel at hearing to
contest denial of welfare assistance).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (Supp. IV, 1974).

